Different types of linguistic classification, ranging from simple inheritance hierarchies to systemic networks, are classified algebraically and order-theoretically. To this end, classifications are reformulated as observational theories. Classifications that do not involve disjunction correspond to Horn theories, whose generic universe ordered by specialization is known to be a Scott domain. Several subtypes of Horn theories, corresponding to simple inheritance with exclusions, are classified with respect to their domains. Systemic classification is shown to have a flat domain. In particular, every finite systemic classification can be translated into a Horn theory. The infinite case turns out to be more subtle since non-equivalent observational theories may induce isomorphic specialization orders.
Introduction
Linguistic classification is often formalized in terms of simple inheritance networks, so-called is(not)a networks, over some set of primitive concepts ( [5] , [4] , [10] ). By means of that, conjunctive and disjunctive concepts (or types) are defined. Constraints that go beyond simple inheritance, like defined concepts or closed world assumptions, are then imposed on the set of these complex concepts.
From a logical point of view, simple inheritance is on a par with other constraints; both are statements of a classificational theory. Conjunctive and disjunctive concepts then belong to the level of description. On the other hand, conjunctive concepts can also serve as members of a canonical model of the theory. This double purpose may have sometimes blurred the distinction between description and denotation. Keeping theory and model apart is of course prerequisite for a clear distinction between logical constructions and structures on the universe of discourse, be it concrete or abstract.
Observational Theories, Algebras, and Domains

Observational Theories
Observational predicates over a set Σ of (primitive) one-place predicates (excluding and ⊥) are inductively built by ∧ and ∨ from members of Σ plus and ⊥. The predicate operators ∧ and ∨ have standard first-order meaning, e.g. φ ∧ ψ is λx(φx ∧ ψx); similarly, is λx(x = x) and ⊥ is λx(x = x). Let T[Σ] be the term algebra of observational predicates over Σ. Observational statements over Σ are universally quantified conditionals ∀x(φx → ψx) with φ, ψ ∈ T[Σ], henceforth written as φ ⊆ ψ. An observational theory Γ over Σ is a set of such statements.
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Recall the notion of interpretation and model for Γ as a first-order theory: a (set-valued) interpretation of Σ consists of a universe U and an interpretation function M from Σ to ℘(U ). M can be inductively extended to T [Σ] by
An interpretation models an observational statement φ ⊆ ψ iff M (φ) ⊆ M (ψ). A model of Γ is an interpretation of Σ that models each of its statements. An interpretation corresponds to a satisfaction relation from U to Σ, which can be extended to one from U to T [Σ] 
Osswald
The fact that negation is not available as an operator on observational predicates -which makes observational logic in a sense "non-classical" -gives rise to a nontrivial preorder on the universe U , called specialization:
If is antisymmetric and hence a partial ordering, we say the model M satisfies identity of indiscernibles. (Notice that if one allows negation, becomes symmetric; for if y but not x satisfies φ then x but not y satisfies ¬φ; hence, x y iff y x iff x and y satisfy precisely the same predicates.) Every observational theory Γ has a canonical (set-valued) model. Its universe C(Γ) is inhabited by the Γ-closed, consistent subsets of Σ, which are specified as follows: for any subset X of Σ define X p ∈ Σ iff p ∈ X; extend inductively to T[Σ], i.e. X always, X ⊥ never, X φ ∧ ψ iff X φ and X ψ, etc.; now let C(Γ) be the set of those X such that for every statement φ ⊆ ψ of Γ, if X φ then X ψ. Specialization on C(Γ) is set inclusion and hence a partial order, which is easily seen to be directed complete. Moreover, it is not difficult see that every Γ-model satisfying identity of indiscernibles can be emedded into the canonical model of Γ (see [12] ), which is thus the "largest" Γ-model subject to identity of indiscernibles. For this reason we call any set-valued model of Γ isomorphic to the canonical one generic, its universe U(Γ) "the" generic universe of Γ, and members of U(Γ) the generic entities determined by Γ.
There is a standard deductive calculus OC for observational statements which is sound and strongly complete with respect to first-order entailment (see Proposition 2.4 below). It consists of axiom schemes φ ⊆ φ, ⊥ ⊆ φ, and φ ⊆ ; its inference schemes are introduction and elimination of ∧ on the right, e.g. if φ ⊆ ψ ∧ χ then φ ⊆ χ, introduction and elimination of ∨ on the left, and cut: if φ ∧ ψ ⊆ χ and φ ⊆ ψ ∨ χ then φ ⊆ χ. If an observational theory Γ OC-entails both φ ⊆ ψ and ψ ⊆ φ, we write φ ≡ Γ ψ. In addition, every observational algebra A is presented by some theory (using generators and relations). Hence ( [11] ), D is equivalent to the quotient category of Th modulo the congruence relation ∼ on the morphism sets, which is defined by:
Proposition 2.2 The categories Th/∼ and D are equivalent.
If h is a theory morphism from Γ to Γ then D(h) is an algebra isomorphism just in case there is a morphism
. We then say that Γ and Γ are (equivalent) translations of each other.
Domains
Let us turn to the question of how to recognize theories as being equivalent by considering their generic universe equipped with some additional structure. Specialization in general does not suffice as the example at the end of Section 3 shows. The set algebra of predicate extensions, in constrast, provides enough information.
This can be seen by representing generic entities as prime filters. First, notice that the models of Γ in 2 = {0, 1} are precisely the characteristic functions of members of C(Γ); by Lemma 2.1, they correspond to algebra morphisms from D(Γ) to 2. Since the inverse images of {1} by these morphisms are the prime filters of D(Γ), we have the following order isomorphisms:
Let Ω(Γ) be the observational algebra of sets that consists of all predicate
As an immediate consequence we get that the calculus OC is sound and strongly complete with respect to first-order entailment. Furthermore, each observational algebra A is isomorphic to an algebra of sets, since A is presented by some theory (Proposition 2.2). Now consider the question in which cases the generic universe U ( Then x is easily seen to be compact.
, the prime filter of D(Γ) corresponding to x is the principal filter generated by [[φ] ]. Vice versa, if x is given by the principal filter generated by [ 
is the supremum of some subset of the set U(Γ)
• of compact elements of U(Γ), the correspondence between compact elements and principal prime filters turns out to be necessary and sufficient for recovering the predicate extensions as the finite unions of sets of the form ↑{x}:
F finite} if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between U(Γ)
• and the set of principal prime filters of D(Γ).
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Since every element of a finite poset is compact and filters of finite lattices are always principal, we get as a special case, by Lemma 2.3: Corollary 2.6 Observational theories over finite sets of primitives are determined uniquely up to equivalence by the specialization order on their generic universe.
Horn Theories and Scott Domains
Observational statements whose conclusions do not involve disjunction are called definite or Horn. Since disjunction can be eliminated from premises, any Horn theory can be transformed into one without disjunction at all. The canonical universe C(Γ) of a Horn theory Γ over Σ is easily seen to be closed with respect to intersection of nonempty subsets and union of directed subsets. Such a system of subsets of Σ is called an inductive intersection system over Σ.
Proposition 2.7
The canonical universe of a Horn theory over Σ is an inductive intersection system over Σ, and every inductive intersection system over Σ arises that way.
Osswald
The generic universe of a Horn theory can be characterized in order-theoretic terms as a bounded-complete algebraic domain with least element, or Scott domain for short (e.g. [8] 
Applications
Simple Inheritance
In [5] , [10] , simple and multidimensional classificational hierarchies are represented by so-called is(not)a networks. Basic statements of such representations are p isa q and p isnota q, with p and q members of some set Σ of primitive predicates. The respective meanings are that everything which is a p is a q and that everything which is a p is not a q; in terms of observational statements: p ⊆ q and p ∧ q ⊆ ⊥. Let us speak of p ⊆ q and p ∧ q ⊆ ⊥ respectively as simple inheritance and binary exclusion statements. Correspondingly, n-ary exclusion statements are of the form
Theories consisting of simple inheritance and exclusion statements are Horn; their Lindenbaum algebra is thus determined by the specialization order. Table 1 classifies several combinations of inheritance and exclusion with respect to their generic universe ordered by specialization.
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Notice that this classifciation does not say that a theory Γ whose generic universe is of a certain type consists of statements of a certain form; it merely says that Γ can be translated into such a theory.
Defined Concepts and Closed World Assumptions
In [5] , constraints that are more complex than simple inheritance and exclusion are taken into account by imposing them on the canonical universe of the simple inheritance plus exclusion part of the classificational theory. The two kinds of complex constraints being considered there are the assumption that certain concepts are defined by their superconcepts and the (closed world) assumption that some concepts are identical to the disjunction of their immediate subconcepts. The canoncial universes of binary exclusion theories are precisely the coherent spaces of Girard. Simple inheritance with binary exclusion resembles the event structures of Winskel, with inheritance interpreted as causal dependency; their generic universes can also be characterized as the pairwise-complete coprime-algebraic domains. 8 In the latter case, [5] actually employs a power domain construction. With regard to the generic universe it does not matter whether to determine first the generic universe of the inheritance part of the theory and then to pick out those generic entities that satisfy additional constraints or whether to proceed the other way around. The general scheme is that if Γ is a subtheory of Γ then C(Γ) is a subset of C(Γ ) and D(Γ) is a quotient of D(Γ ).
Feature Based Classification
Though not the main issue here, it is worth mentioning that feature based classification, which is ubiquitous in current linguistic frameworks (e.g. [15] ), can be subsumed under the present approach. The set of primitive predicates in this case consists of elementary attribute-value predicates of the form π :σ and π . = ρ, where π and ρ are (possible composed) attributes and σ is a (monadic) sort predicate. With : and . = reconstructed as predicate operators -π :σ is λx∃y(πyx ∧ σy) whereas π . = ρ is λx∃y(πyx ∧ ρyx) -and attributes assumed as functional, one easily derives valid (first-order) attribute-value statements like π . = ρ ∧ π :σ ⊆ ρ:σ (see [13] ). Attribute-value logic ([4], [14] ) then corresponds to a set AVL of valid attribute-value statements which is complete in the sense that AVL entails any other such statements by OC. Since AVL is a Horn theory without exclusions (as long as no additional sort constraints come into play), we can read off from Table 1 that the generic universe of AVL is a complete algebraic lattice. On the other hand, it is well known (e.g. [14] ) that AVL-closed sets of elementary attribute-value predicates represent abstract feature structures.
If AVL is enriched by additional attribute value statements -e.g. the constraints of a certain grammatical theory -, then the resulting generic universe need not be a Scott domain nor need it be algebraic at all. Nevertheless, its generic entities correspond to those abstract feature structure that satisfy the additional constraints. Moreover, OC plus an inference scheme for prefixing (if φ ⊆ ψ then π :φ ⊆ π :ψ) provides a sound and strongly complete deductive calculus (cf. [13] ).
Systemic Classification
Similar to taxonomies, systemic networks are based on the idea that linguistic classifiers are grouped into paradigms or choice systems. However, systemic networks allow complex logical dependencies between choice systems. See [18] for extensive linguistic applications of systemic classification.
Osswald
Formalized as an observational theory, a systemic network over some set Σ of primitives consists of statements of the form
where P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } belongs to some partition Π of Σ into finite subsets, the choice systems, and φ P is a member of T[Σ] − { , ⊥}, the (entry) condition of P ; in addition, every two members p and q of one and the same choice system are assumed to be incompatible, that is, p ∧ q ≡ ⊥. 10 The following small fragment illustrates how logical presentation and standard network notation relate to each other: choice systems correspond to vertical bars with their members aligned in a column to the right of the bar; conjunction and disjunction correspond respectively to brace and bar.
A choice system Q is said to precede P , in symbols, Q ≺ P , iff some member of Q occurs in the entry condition φ P of P . (In the above example, the choice system {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 } is preceded by the choice systems the a i 's belong to.) In the following, systemic theories are assumed to have a well-founded precedence relation, whose transitive closure has a least element.
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In particular, there is a single root system for which no condition is defined and from which every other system is reachable by ≺.
Proposition 3.1 Systemic theories induce flat specialization order.
Proof. Let Γ be a systemic theory. Then ∅ ∈ C(Γ). Suppose X, Y ∈ C(Γ), ∅ = X ⊆ Y . We need to show that Y ⊆ X, because then C(Γ) has flat inclusion order. It suffices to show that Y ∩ P = ∅ → X ∩ P = ∅ for every P ∈ Π, since members of P are pairwise incompatible and X ⊆ Y . We apply the principle of well-founded induction: Suppose, Y ∩ Q = ∅ → X ∩ Q = ∅, for every Q ≺ P . If P has condition φ P and Y ∩ P = ∅ then Y φ P , since Y ∈ C(Γ). By induction hypothesis, for every primitive q occurring in φ P , if Y q then X q. Consequently, by term induction on φ P , X φ P and thus X ∩ P = ∅. It remains to consider the case where P is the root and therefore has no entry condition. Since X = ∅, there is a Q ∈ Π such that X ∩ Q = ∅. If Q = P then X φ Q and hence X ∩ Q = ∅ for some Q ≺ Q. Therefore, by induction, X ∩ P = ∅. 12 2 9 φ ≡ ψ is shorthand for: φ ⊆ ψ and ψ ⊆ φ. 10 The representation of systemic networks by is(not)a networks given in [4] falls short in two respects: it does not take disjunctive entry conditions into account and it does not capture the implication of choice disjunctions by entry conditions. 11 Well-foundedness implies the usually assumed acyclicity of ≺; on finite sets, the two notions are equivalent. 12 The root case aside, the same proof shows that systemic theories induce discrete order,
Osswald
Corollary 3.2 Every finite systemic theory has a Horn translation.
This observation conflicts with [3] , where it is presumed that not every (finite) systemic network can be expected to have a Horn translation. What can be said in accordance with the intentions of [3] is that it is unlikely (unless P = N P) that every systemic theory can be translated to Horn in polynomial time because systemic classification is N P-complete, whereas satisfiability of Horn clauses (Horn-SAT) is in P. (Horn-SAT is actually solvable in linear time; e.g. [6] ). More precisely, it is an N P-complete problem to decide whether a given subset of Σ is consistent, i.e. is included in some member of C(Γ). The reason is that satisfiability of Boolean expressions in conjunctive normal form is N P-complete, and every such expression φ with variables x 1 , . . . , x n can be straightforwardly translated (in linear time) into a systemic theory over {x 1 , ¬x 1 , . . . , x n , ¬x n , r, c} with choice systems {r}, {c}, and {x i , ¬x i } and statements r ≡ x i ∨ ¬x i , x i ∧ ¬x i ≡ ⊥, and φ ≡ c. Then φ is satisfiable iff {c} is consistent.
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Using the last correspondence of Table 1 instead of the first, Corollary 3.2 can be strengthened to the effect that systemic theories are equivalent to full binary exclusion theories. Translation, however, has to be done by brute force: take all generic entities of Γ (e.g. the 2-valued models of Γ) except the bottom element as pairwise incompatible primitives and translate p into the disjunction of all generic entities satisfying p. A more practical approach should use an iterative "local" translationà la [3] , for which Section 2 continues to provide the appropriate formal framework.
An Infinite Systemic Theory
We conclude the section on systemic classification by giving a simple example of an infinite theory that does not admit a Horn translation. Consider the following theory Γ over {a 0 , a 1 , . . .} ∪ {b 0 , b 1 , . . .}: when rootedness is given up and the condition of each ≺-minimal system is . 13 [2] uses a similar encoding to represent the 3SAT problem. 
Conclusion
The framework of observational logic seems to be well suited for formalizing linguistic classifications such as simple and complex inheritance hierarchies, systemic classifications, and feature based theories. On the one hand, observational theories are equipped with the standard semantics of first-order logic; on the other hand, due to the lack of negation, there is a non-trivial (pre)order on the universe of their models. Observational logic thereby naturally reconciles the often discussed partial object/partial description views with standard classical logic. Moreover, observational theories have a canonical model, whose universe serves as the generic denotation of the theory. Classifying classifications with respect to the specialization order on their generic universe gives a better understanding of how the latter depend on the former and vice versa. It is of practical use if one wants to enforce specialization to satisfy certain properties. For example, the condition of Lemma 2.5 implies that every finite set of (compact) generic entities has a finite complete set of upper bounds. A possible research program therefore is to look for natural classes of observational theories that induce "good" specialization order. For example, it is shown in [19] that theories whose statements have disjunctions of pairwise incompatible primitives as conclusions, thereby generalizing systemic classification, correspond to algebraic L-domains. Another possible strand of research is concerned with the complexity of translations between different types of observational theories.
